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DANGERS OF DEFERENCE TO FORM
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Amy J. Schmitz*
This Article is part of my larger project exploring what I call “contracting cul-
ture,” which borrows from legal realism and relational contract theory by consider-
ing contextual factors such as negotiators’ relations, understandings, and values.  As
part of this project, I am pursuing various threads, including empirical studies of
how contracting realities impact arbitration.  In this Article, however, I focus on how
these realities in business to consumer contracts combine with the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act and formulaic contract law to foster dangerous deference to form arbitration
provisions.  The Article then invites procedural reforms and offers suggestions for
regulations aimed to temper this deference to protect consumers’ dispute resolution
needs without sapping the beneficial use of consumer arbitration.
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses are becoming the norm in consumer form
contracts, and United States courts strictly enforce these clauses under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and states’ adoptions of the Uniform Arbitration
Act (“UAA”).1  In addition, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence
has relegated challenges of arbitration agreements to general contract defenses,
which many courts apply in narrow and formulaic ways that ignore contracting
realities, or in unpredictable manners that leave parties without contracting gui-
dance.2  At the same time, courts have confirmed the limited review and final-
ity of arbitration awards.3
At a recent conference, I presented a paper questioning courts’ formulaic
enforcement of arbitration agreements without substantive consideration of
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.  Special thanks to Professor
Sternlight, the UNLV Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, and the other organizers of
and participants in the Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act Symposium (Las Vegas,
Nevada, Jan. 26, 2007).  I also thank Melissa Pingley and Matthew Peters for their research
assistance.
1 See Yvette Ostolaza, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Financial Ser-
vices Contracts, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 265, 265-66 (2006) (noting growth of con-
sumer arbitration in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent FAA jurisprudence); see also
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (finding that the “liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” supported enforcement of an arbitration
agreement although the agreement was silent with respect to arbitration costs and fees (quot-
ing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
2 See Ostolaza, supra note 1, at 265-67 (discussing how courts’ unpredictable application of
unconscionability stymies companies’ ability to draft reliable arbitration contracts); Alan M.
White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233,
233–35, 255–56, 262–63 (2002) (discussing “excessive formalism” as preventing courts
from policing contract fairness).
3 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl:  Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Func-
tional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124–32 (2002) (discussing the finality of arbitration
awards under the FAA and UAA).
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consent, contractual context, or repeat-player advantages.4  Borrowing from the
work of Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil,5 I proposed that courts should
consider “contracting culture,” which encompasses parties’ relations, under-
standings, and values with respect to dispute resolution.  I also suggested that
these cultures fall on a continuum ranging from “intra to extra communal,”
depending on the degree parties’ relations, understandings, and needs converge
or compete.  I used consumer form contracting as an example of an often extra
communal culture due to consumers’ and corporate sellers’ lack of personal
connections and diverging dispute resolution understandings and values.6
I now take this a step further in considering how this culture has fostered
deference to companies’ form arbitration provisions and rules, thereby allowing
them to essentially privatize justice.  This deference to these private rules hap-
pens on many levels:  (a) companies promulgate form arbitration clauses dictat-
ing arbitration provisions that disproportionately serve their needs; (b)
arbitration institutions’ rules these companies incorporate in their clauses leave
room for companies’ self-interested provisions and may favor these companies
as core clientele; (c) consumers assume enforcement of form provisions and
rarely even attempt to negotiate them due to lack of awareness, resources, and
bargaining power; and (d) courts then reinforce and defer to this regime by
strictly enforcing these form arbitration provisions under the FAA and formal-
istic contract analysis.
Meanwhile, procedural protocols lack power to derail this regime.  The
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), in association with a National
Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”), promul-
gated the Consumer Due Process Protocol (“Protocol”) in 1998 in an effort to
instill minimum fairness guidelines for how companies and institutions
“should” administer consumer arbitration and mediation programs.7  These
“shoulds” include clear notice of arbitration clauses and how to obtain informa-
tion regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers’ access to
small claims court, and measures ensuring “reasonable cost to consumers” and
“reasonably convenient” hearing locations.8
Despite the promulgation of the Protocol nine years ago, however, many
companies have declined to implement its provisos in their arbitration pro-
grams.  Furthermore, companies often leave consumers with no choice but to
accept these programs or forgo necessary products or services.  For example,
my examination of nine of the biggest cell phone service companies’ form con-
tracts revealed that consumers who want cell phone service have no real choice
but to accept onerous arbitration rules.9  This is especially problematic to the
4 See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration
Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123 (2007) [hereinafter Schmitz, Contracting Culture].
5 See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV.
589, 589–93 (1974) (discussing his “relational contracts” concepts and critiquing “presentia-
tion” in classical law).
6 See Schmitz, Contracting Culture, supra note 4, at 126, 145-72.
7 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 [hereinafter PROTOCOL].
8 Id.
9 See Collected Cell Phone and Credit Card Arbitration Provisions (on file with author); see
also Notes from Consumer Focus Group by Amy J. Schmitz, in Denver, Colo. (Nov. 18,
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extent cell phone service has become necessary for consumers’ safety and basic
communication needs.
Although some courts have used unconscionability and other contract
defenses to police onerous arbitration clauses, other courts seem to adopt an
“everyone’s doing it” attitude in deferring to these form clauses and rules.
They emphasize efficiency goals of contract law in applying formulistic analy-
sis to assume assent and deny unconscionability challenges of these provisions.
Commentators then frown on what they deem proactive use of unconscionabil-
ity to strike arbitration clauses and argue that such use violates the Supreme
Court’s staunch stance on FAA preemption.10  This has resulted in haphazard
contract law regulation of arbitration that has left consumers without clear or
adequate protection from onerous arbitration clauses and companies without
contracting guidance.11
Accordingly, this Article questions the propriety of courts’ and contrac-
tors’ deference to companies’ consumer arbitration regimes and seeks to spark
balanced consideration of federal legislative reforms aimed to temper the
FAA’s “one-size-fits-all” enforcement of arbitration.  Furthermore, instead of
calling for a ban on all consumer arbitration, the Article invites interested con-
stituencies to collaborate in crafting mandatory procedural reforms that protect
consumers’ access to justice without quelling companies’ beneficial use of arbi-
tration programs.  At the least, the Article suggests that policymakers transform
the Protocol “shoulds” into “musts,” especially when consumers’ statutory
rights are at stake.
Part I of the Article discusses the growth and nature of arbitration clauses
in form consumer contracts and the institutional rules these clauses generally
incorporate.  Part II explains how contracting parties and courts defer to these
form clauses and rules, thereby tipping what the Article calls the “dominos of
deference” against consumers’ fair access to justice.  Part III then explores the
necessity and establishment of legislative procedural protections in consumer
arbitration and offers suggestions for minimum procedural fairness rules that
borrow from the Protocol.  The Article concludes by emphasizing that these are
only initial suggestions offered to spark further consideration and debate
regarding procedural rules that ensure consumers’ fair access to means for vin-
dicating their statutory rights without sapping arbitration of its efficiency
benefits.
I. PREVALENCE OF FORM ARBITRATION CLAUSES
AND INCORPORATED RULES
Form arbitration provisions and the institutional rules they incorporate are
contract terms.  It therefore seems appropriate for courts to enforce them under
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Focus Group] (consumers reporting feel-
ings that they lack choice with respect to arbitration terms in form contracts).
10 Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine:
How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 39, 39-41 (2006); see also Ostolaza, supra note 1, at 265-66, 268 (discussing
preemption).
11 Ostolaza, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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the FAA and contract law.  The problem is that courts’ formalistic enforcement
of form contracts converges with their FAA-inspired pro-arbitration glaze to
fuel deference to these arbitration clauses that overlooks how these legal forces
function in the real world of consumer contracting.  Form arbitration clauses
are generally not negotiated, but are buried terms in the boilerplate of pre-
dispute contracts that consumers may not read or understand.12  In addition,
consumers rarely have the power or experience to negotiate these clauses and
may not have easy access to information regarding company-selected arbitra-
tion rules or administrators.13
A. Preeminent Consumer Arbitration Provisions
Most consumer arbitration agreements are “boilerplate,” pre-printed form
contract clauses.  Furthermore, “repeat player” retailers and manufacturers rou-
tinely include these arbitration clauses in their non-negotiable form contracts,
allowing these players to dictate the rules individuals must follow in asserting
their claims.14  This may be problematic when repeat players use arbitration as
means for curbing consumer remedies and preventing class actions.  In addi-
tion, it allows them to shield the public from information regarding their
wrongs and essentially to privatize justice.15
For example, consumers in Comb v. PayPal, Inc. challenged arbitration
provisions PayPal required customers to accept for its electronic disbursements
services under its “clickwrap” agreement on its website.16  The provisions
defied the Protocol by limiting their remedies and subjecting them to high costs
through arbitration.  Although consumers mainly used PayPal for small transac-
tions averaging $55, the arbitration clause precluded any class or consolidated
relief, and did not allow customers to pursue claims in small claims court
12 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235,
1240-43 (2006) (highlighting how “‘boilerplate’ has itself taken on a cultural meaning” that
translates into a signal that such form terms are not negotiable, especially with respect to
arbitration clauses).
13 See Soile Pohjonen, Proactive Contracting:  In Contracts Between Businesses, 12 IUS
GENTIUM 155, 165-70 (2006) (discussing how parties in various contexts may not read or
understand contract terms).
14 I will not rehash the full debate regarding consumer arbitration, as it has been hotly
debated for years. See generally EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) [hereinafter ARBITRATION LAW].  Notably, the U.S.
diverges from other countries by strictly enforcing non-negotiable form arbitration provi-
sions in consumer contracts. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION
LAW, supra, at 127, 129-32, 138-40 (highlighting American law’s enforcement of mandatory
consumer arbitration under pre-dispute form contracts).
15 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704-12, 754 (1999) (discussing how “[a]rbitration priva-
tizes the creation of law”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania?  Protecting Pro-
cedurally Fair Arbitration in a Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291,
313-15, 371 (2005) [hereinafter Schmitz, MH Mania] (discussing how manufacturers’ use of
form arbitration agreements has privatized dispute resolution in the mobile home industry).
16 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  The clickwrap
contract on PayPal’s website required customers to click on “I accept” or “I agree” with
respect to the company’s User Agreement before accessing the companies’ services. Id.
This applied for PayPal account holders using the service and parties who were not PayPal
customers, but sought to access funds sent by account holders. Id. at 1173 n.10.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 5 16-JAN-08 13:41
Fall 2007] DANGERS OF DEFERENCE 41
instead of arbitration.17  Furthermore, PayPal’s arbitration clause required con-
sumers to arbitrate in PayPal’s home state of California and prescribed applica-
tion of the AAA’s rules for commercial instead of consumer arbitration,
thereby requiring consumers to pay high travel costs and an equal share of fees
in excess of $5000.18  These factors accumulated to lead a California court to
strike the arbitration clause as allowing PayPal to “insulate itself” from any
meaningful challenges of its practices.19
Consumers cannot, however, rely on courts to police the fairness of form
arbitration provisions using general contract law.  Most courts are formulaic in
their rejections of contract challenges of arbitration clauses, and commentators
criticize courts such as those in California for being overly proactive.20  Fur-
thermore, the FAA preempts targeted application of contract defenses to arbi-
tration clauses, and even California courts may be increasing their support for
arbitration.  For example, a California court recently condoned enforcement of
U-Haul’s form arbitration provision although it required employees to waive
their rights to class or representative proceedings.21
B. Importance of Incorporated Institutional Rules
Arbitral institutions such as the AAA, the International Chamber of Com-
merce (“ICC”), and the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) administer arbi-
tration proceedings and promulgate rules companies routinely incorporate by
reference in their consumer form contracts.22  These rules may promote effi-
ciency by providing procedural direction and saving parties from investing their
resources to draft detailed contractual rules they may never use.23  Institutional
rules also may provide needed neutrality in international disputes or suit partic-
ular legal systems or cultures.24  For example, European parties often favor
ICC rules because they limit the evidentiary focus to documents, while Ameri-
17 Id. at 1173, 1175-77.
18 Id. at 1176-77 (noting that the California venue was PayPal’s “backyard”).
19 Id.
20 See Broome, supra note 10, at 40-41 (critiquing California courts’ use of unconscionabil-
ity to police arbitration clauses).
21 Konig v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 246-47 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
the clause was not unconscionable because it was not clear that it would bar employees’
access to remedies for “predictably . . . small amounts of damages”).  Nonetheless, this
opinion has now been superseded, 153 P.3d 955 (Cal. 2007), to allow for reconsideration in
the wake of Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007), which placed new limits on
pre-dispute class action waivers in employment contracts.
22 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution:  Securities Arbitration Confronts the
Hard Questions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1996) (discussing how arbitration under NASD or
NYSE rules has become mandatory under most broker-dealer contracts).
23 See Erik Scha¨fer, The Use of Arbitration and Mediation for Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights:  A German Perspective, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 695, 714-15 (2004) (discussing
how parties may include particular institutional procedural rules in their arbitration clauses to
supplement the clauses’ minimal provisions); see also Philip D. O’Neill, The Power of Arbi-
trators to Award Monetary Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2005-Jan.
2006, at 60, 63-65 (discussing importance of arbitral rules in clarifying arbitrators’ power to
sanction parties as means for enforcing discovery orders).
24 See ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 5-6, 141-49 (noting varied approaches of spon-
soring institutions); Scha¨fer, supra note 23, at 714-15 (noting neutrality).
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can parties tend to prefer AAA rules that allow for broader-ranging discov-
ery.25  Institutions also provide a third-party forum that may help quell tensions
among parties with varied backgrounds and experiences.26
In addition, arbitration institutions may craft reasonable rules to garner
goodwill and are more likely than self-interested contracting parties to consider
the needs of all disputants.27  They also may bring together various constituen-
cies to develop dispute resolution programs geared for particular industries, as
the AAA has done with respect to construction disputes.28  Again, the AAA
also played a large part in establishing the Protocol’s suggested consumer
guidelines.29  These included measures geared to give consumers access to
information regarding providers’ dispute resolution programs, rights to bring
disputes to small claims court, and arbitration proceedings at reasonable costs
in convenient locations.30  In addition, the AAA announced that it will adminis-
ter class arbitration under its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if the
parties’ agreement provides that disputes shall be resolved by arbitration in
accordance with any of the AAA’s rules and the agreement expressly allows or
is silent regarding class relief, consolidation, or joinder of claims.31
Similarly, the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”)
requires that written awards be provided to the parties and the public in its
arbitrations.32  It also has proposed rules allowing parties to require arbitrators
to issue these awards with reasoned opinions.33  Furthermore, the NASD has
sought to reduce brokers’ nonpayment of arbitration awards since the United
States General Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued several reports regarding
rampant nonpayment rates.34  NASD arbitration, however, is quasi-public to
25 ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 138-44.
26 See id. at 141-49 (describing breadth of major sponsoring organizations).
27 This may be particularly true with respect to the NASD because it is subject to govern-
mental oversight. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Dispute Res-
olution to Provide Arbitration Awards Online (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.finra.
org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2001NewsReleases/P010078 (stating how NASD worked
with the Securities Arbitration Commentator to make awards readily accessible online and
maintain the library of awards).
28 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY’S GUIDE TO DISPUTE
AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3839
(explaining how the AAA works with the various constituencies in the construction industry
to develop dispute resolution procedures and processes required by leading form contracts
promulgated by the American Institute of Architects and the Associated General Contractors
of America).
29 PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at princs. 1-15 & Reporter’s Cmts.
30 Id.; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCEDURES (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter AAA
CONSUMER RULES].
31 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?ID=21936 [hereinafter AAA CLASS ARBITRATION];
Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), available at http:/
/www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967.
32 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 10330 (amended 1997), available at http://
finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000927.
33 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanation in Arbitration
Awards, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (proposed Mar. 15, 2005).
34 See Per Jebsen, How to Fix Unpaid Arbitration Awards, 26 PACE L. REV. 183, 183-95
(2005).  Along with instituting other notice and enforcement measures, the NASD amended
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the extent that the NASD is a self-regulated agency subject to the oversight of
the GAO and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).35  This means
that the government must approve and monitor the NASD’s arbitration rules
and procedures.36
Unregulated administering institutions, however, may have incentive to
skew their rules and decisions to favor companies they hope to attract as well-
paying repeat clients.37  With escalating competition for arbitration business,
administering institutions must market themselves and their rules to the compa-
nies that control form contract terms in order to ensure steady business.38
These institutions also may seek to attract and retain repeat players by consult-
ing with them in developing their rules and giving arbitrators incentive to favor
these companies.39  At the least, institutions may promulgate permissive rules
that do not scare away corporate clients by appearing too favorable for consum-
ers and employees.
In the end, most arbitration institutions adopt broad rules that cover only
major procedural events in arbitration.40  This generally includes claim submis-
sion, arbitrator selection, some information exchange, broad hearing parame-
ters, and award form and timing.41  Furthermore, institutional rules usually give
arbitrators great discretion in conducting proceedings.42  Moreover, even when
its code of procedures to streamline default proceedings against defunct brokers and to bar
delinquent brokers from enforcing contracts requiring NASD arbitration. Id. at 191-93.
35 See id. at 196-99 (explaining how although the NASD is not a “state actor,” it bears
policy responsibilities); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration:  A
Constitutional Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73, 83-96 (2005) (proposing that securities arbi-
tration involves state action to the extent employers mandate arbitration as a condition of
employment and the NASD administers securities arbitrations subject to SEC oversight).
36 See, e.g., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD Relating to Amendments to
Rule 10301 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, 66 Fed. Reg. 19,267 (Apr. 13, 2001).
37 See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1211, 1212, 1232-35 (2006) (discussing “repeat player” advantages with respect to arbitra-
tion privacy); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1650–61 (2005) (examining the “repeat player” phenomenon).
38 For example, there have been allegations that the NAF is predisposed to favor lenders
that require its consumer clients to arbitrate all claims with the NAF under its rules.  Posting
of Paul Bland to Consumer Law & Policy Blog, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2006/10/
national_arbitr.html (Oct. 19, 2006, 8:16 EST).
39 See id. (describing affidavits and other evidence in McQuillan v. Check N Go indicating
that NAF targeted its advertisements and solicitations to banks, sent its arbitrators judgment
forms “filled out so that all the arbitrator need do is check the appropriate box” to allow
banks to quickly collect on delinquent debts, and blocked arbitrators from serving if they
ruled against corporate parties); see also Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401
(2003) (No. 02-215) (arguing that NAF’s rules and practices are unfavorable for consumers,
and attaching NAF marketing letters to lenders boasting how NAF can “minimize lawsuits”
and “the threat of lender liability jury verdicts”).
40 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 [hereinafter AAA
COMMERCIAL RULES].
41 See ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 43-56, 138-149.
42 See id. at 145 (again highlighting vagueness of arbitration rules).
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institutions prescribe procedural rules to protect consumers, companies may
contract around any rules they dislike.43
The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, for example, prescribe arbitra-
tion filing and administrative fees that usually exceed $5000, and require par-
ties to split those fees, subject to reallocation in the award.44  These rules also
leave arbitrators without clear authority to require depositions or enforce any
discovery orders.  The AAA Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related
Disputes, however, cap consumer fees in disputes arising out of form contracts
between businesses and consumers.  They also preserve consumers’ rights to
bring these disputes to small claims courts.45
It is nonetheless up to contract drafters to select and incorporate such con-
sumer procedures in their contracts.  Institutions’ rules are not statutory man-
dates.  This means that contract drafters may take, leave, or modify rules to suit
their needs.46  The FAA then dictates that courts enforce arbitration provisions
as written.  Likewise, the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) and the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration require that
courts respect parties’ contractual choice of procedural provisions.47
Accordingly, companies that dictate terms of form contracts may choose
the rules that will apply in their arbitrations and specify the procedures they
desire.  For example, PayPal opted to incorporate the AAA Commercial Arbi-
tration Rules in lieu of the AAA’s consumer procedures in its “clickwrap” con-
tract at issue in Comb, and the court assumed that it would have to honor that
incorporation.48  The court therefore declined to ignore the contract’s terms in
order to allow for the AAA’s application of the consumer procedures to ease
cost burdens on consumers.49  This meant that the consumers faced over $2500
in arbitration fees, instead of enjoying the AAA Consumer Rules’ $125 cap for
43 See generally American Arbitration Association Home Page, http://www.adr.org (last
visited Dec. 11, 2007).
44 AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 40, R-43 (allowing for allocation of fees and costs
in the award “as the arbitrator determines is appropriate”), R-49 (requiring parties to pay
filing fees for their asserted claims unless “extreme hardship” is shown), R-50 (requiring
parties to bear expenses of their own witnesses and split other arbitrator fees and expenses
unless agreed otherwise) & R-21 (allowing arbitrators to direct “the production of documents
and other information” and “the identification of any witnesses to be called” but adding no
enforcement “teeth” to this provision); see also O’Neill, supra note 23, at 63-64 (discussing
how NASD rules also fail to provide for sanctions or other means for enforcing arbitrators’
discovery orders).
45 See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 30 (but also permitting parties to dispute the
applicability of these rules).
46 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 & n.15, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
47 See Elizabeth Shackelford, Party Autonomy and Regional Harmonization of Rules in
International Commercial Arbitration, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 897, 900-03 (2006) (discussing
the centrality of party autonomy in international arbitration).
48 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 & n.15, 1177 (declining to accept PayPal’s arguments
that the consumer rules would override the commercial rules in light of the express contract
language courts must enforce under the FAA). But see Shackelford, supra note 47, at 908-
12 (arguing that even when parties incorporate institutional rules in their arbitration agree-
ments, they should not be held to application of rule amendments that exceed their reasona-
ble expectations).
49 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77 n.16.
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small claims.50  In addition, PayPal’s contract prevented consumers from using
class or consolidated proceedings to ease costs by asserting their claims as a
group.  It also imposed possibly high travel costs on consumers by requiring
them to arbitrate in PayPal’s home location of California.51
II. DOMINOS OF DEFERENCE TO FORM ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Drafters of form contract terms usually dictate the rules of arbitration in
consumer exchanges with little resistance due to courts’ and contractors’ defer-
ence to form provisions.  Consumers rarely negotiate or question form arbitra-
tion terms, and courts reinforce this deference by presumptively enforcing the
terms under the FAA and formalistic contract law.  The domino effect of this
deference results in treatment of form terms like private “law”—not subject to
alteration or considered scrutiny.52
A. Contracting Parties’ Adherence to Form Contracts
Drafters of form contract provisions incorporate institutional arbitration
rules and modify their provisos to create arbitration terms that suit their inter-
ests.  After that, however, parties rarely discuss, negotiate, or modify these
form terms.  They usually enter transactions with optimism that no disputes
will arise and do not expend resources considering or discussing the likely
impacts of breach.53  “Deal lawyers” usually focus on getting the deal done
during contract negotiations and view considerations of potential disputes as
not “their problem.”54  They expect litigators to clean up any problems in con-
tract performance.55  Moreover, they correctly assume that they eventually
would resolve any contract disputes without court assistance.56
Contracting parties also may treat the subject of breach as taboo during
initial negotiations.57  They seek peaceful and productive contracting relations
50 Id. at 1176.
51 Id. at 1170, 1175-77.
52 As a practicing attorney and now as a teacher, individuals continually tell me that they
view form terms like “law” not subject to modification or challenge.
53 See Robert A. Hillman, Remedies and the CISG:  Another Perspective, 25 INT’L REV. L
& ECON. 411, 412-13 (2005) (considering why parties fail to bargain over remedy and dam-
ages provisions in pre-dispute contracts); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55-56, 60-64 (1963) [hereinafter
Macaulay, Relations] (finding in a study of business contracting that parties rarely discuss
provisions regarding resolution of future disputes during initial contract negotiations).
54 See James C. Freund, Calling All Deal Lawyers—Try Your Hand at Resolving Disputes,
62 BUS. LAW. 37, 42-44 (2006) (describing his and other transactions lawyers’ experiences
and proposing that “deal lawyers” should use their problem-solving skills to help resolve
disputes).
55 Id. (also noting how deal lawyers employ boilerplate that have typical terms for arbitra-
tion, but nothing about avoiding litigation or arbitration).
56 See Stewart Macaulay, Freedom from Contract:  Solutions in Search of a Problem?,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 777, 777-80 [hereinafter Macaulay, Freedom from Contract] (discussing
the scarcity of litigated contracts cases and reporting a 37% decline in contracts case filings
in Wisconsin from 1992 to 2001).
57 See Hillman, supra note 53, at 413 (addressing how contracting parties are usually
uncomfortable discussing breach during pre-contract negotiations).
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and to avoid detailed nitpicking that may interfere with smooth negotiations.58
They also fear that raising pre-contract concerns with conflict may taint collab-
orative discussions or push parties away from a deal.59  Negotiating parties
therefore focus on overall trust building and performance planning, as well as
navigating their own “intrafirm politics.”60
Companies may nonetheless take great care in crafting dispute resolution
and other provisions in their form contracts.  This generally is economically
efficient because they expect to use these forms continually and can spread
drafting costs over many transactions.61  Furthermore, companies know that
these terms will control most or all consumer transactions because consumers
are unlikely to resist form terms.62  Moreover, consumers may be particularly
reluctant to question form terms due to their feelings of low power and status
with retailers.63
Negotiators also accept form terms without question due to contracting
inertia and general preference for provisions that operate without requiring
action.64  This is true even if those terms are contrary to standard industry prac-
tice or legal defaults.65  In addition, consumers often do not see need to negoti-
ate or resist form arbitration provisions because they do not appreciate the
provisions’ effects or realize how terms may foster unfairness in practice.66
Moreover, consumers often feel any attempt to seek changes in form terms
would be futile.67  This effectively prevents them from resisting form arbitra-
tion clauses even when the clauses bar class relief or other remedies consumers
later wish they had retained.68  Companies therefore limit consumer remedies
58 See Macaulay, Relations, supra note 53, at 60-65 (emphasizing importance of fostering
positive business relations).
59 Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:  The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1606-09 (1998) (discuss-
ing his study testing the power of default contract provisions and finding negotiators gener-
ally acquiesce in status quo contract terms due to fear that suggesting departure could cause
bargaining impasse).
60 William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
631, 635-37 (explaining why parties in relational contracts often rely on implicit terms of
their deals).
61 See id. at 638 (noting how businesses may devote more resources in drafting consumer
contracts).
62 Id.
63 Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts:  A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 29-34 (2002).
64 Korobkin, supra note 59, at 1605-09, 1627 (highlighting importance of action versus
inaction).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1585-87, 1607-09, 1627 (finding in support of his “inertia theory” that negotiators
generally prefer terms that operate without specific bargaining).
67 Consumers in the focus groups I recently conducted in Denver, Colorado reported feel-
ings of powerlessness in contracting and stated that they do not attempt to negotiate form
terms because it would be futile.  Consumer Focus Group, supra note 9.
68 See Korobkin, supra note 59, at 1627; see also Consumer Focus Group, supra note 9
(consumers reporting that they value the options of judicial and class relief, and generally are
unfamiliar with arbitration, but assume that companies impose it on them because it dispro-
portionately benefits the companies).
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and “slip” questionable terms into their form arbitration provisions with little
resistance.
One may argue that the law should not provide consumer protections
because it is consumers’ responsibility to read, negotiate, and resist arbitration
terms they deem unfair.  Indeed, consumers should be more vigilant in their
contracting practices and protecting their interests.  However, consumers often
lack access to counsel or information regarding arbitration, and are correct in
their assumptions that they lack power to challenge form provisions.  They also
report instances in which they have difficulty even contacting retailers to nego-
tiate or challenge form terms.  Consumers especially lament the struggles they
face in seeking to contact companies via the Internet to clarify or question e-
contract terms.69  They complain that salespersons insist they lack power to
negotiate company controlled form terms and assert that forms are not subject
to alteration.70
It is true that some consumers do make unreasonable demands on retail-
ers.71  Most consumers, however, feel trapped in the powerlessness that has
become so pervasive that it is the folly of Dilbert cartoons.72  Choice and con-
sent to remedy limitations have become legal fictions in consumer form con-
tracts, but courts often condone form provisions in the name of efficiency.  It is
therefore time to instill fairness limits on these form contracts in order to revive
the consumer trust that is central to efficient workings of our economic
markets.73
B. Judicial Enforcement Based on the FAA and Contract Formalism
The Supreme Court has fueled expansion of consumer arbitration by inter-
preting the FAA to require strict enforcement of arbitration contract terms and
to preempt state law attempts to regulate arbitration.74  The Court has held that
the FAA precludes states from singling out arbitration agreements for special
treatment or otherwise interfering with their enforcement when they affect
interstate commerce.75  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has steadily denied
claims that arbitration clauses overly burden parties’ ability to vindicate their
statutory rights.  Courts therefore hold that consumers may be required to arbi-
trate deceptive practices, fraud, and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(“MMWA”) claims.76  These courts conclude that instead of denying or limit-
69 See Consumer Focus Group, supra note 9.
70 Id.
71 See Macaulay, Freedom from Contract, supra note 56, at 807 (acknowledging this
reality).
72 See id. at 808 (noting how even Dilbert has chronicled consumers’ lack of true consent to
shrink-wrap disclaimers).
73 Id. at 819-20.
74 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes:  Due Process Protocol Pro-
tects Consumer Rights, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 8, 9-11 (highlighting the vast expan-
sion of arbitration in light of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration glaze on the FAA).
75 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding the FAA pre-
empted Alabama law limiting consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984) (holding that the FAA applies in federal and state court).
76 See Dobson, 513 U.S. 265; Keating, 465 U.S. 1; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2000) (finding Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claims under a
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ing consumers’ claims, arbitration clauses merely prescribe an alternative
forum for resolution of those claims.77
Nonetheless, some individuals have successfully challenged arbitration
clauses based on claims that particular provisions, such as high arbitration
costs or bans on class actions, preclude them from vindicating their statutory
rights.78  A few courts have found such procedural provisions so burdensome
on consumers that they effectively prevent consumers from asserting MMWA
or other statutory rights.79  These courts then may order arbitration without the
burdensome procedures or strike the arbitration clause in its entirety where
offending provisions taint the clause as a whole.
Such successful challenges are nonetheless rare.80  The MMWA and its
implementing regulations expressly allow for only nonbinding “informal dis-
pute settlement procedures,” but most courts hold that these provisions do not
displace the FAA’s enforcement of agreements to submit disputes to binding
arbitration.81  Furthermore, courts rely on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Ran-
dolph to reject challenges based on consumer claims of oppressive arbitration
costs.82  They generally find that consumers are unable to clear the high hurdle
set by Randolph of clearly proving they are highly likely to bear onerous arbi-
tration costs and lack the ability to pay those costs.83  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the courts give arbitrators the benefit of the doubt that they will waive or
reallocate truly oppressive fees.84  Consumers must therefore pay fees and pro-
consumer financing agreement may be subject to binding arbitration under the FAA); Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1989) (overruling prior
opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable); Schmitz, MH Mania, supra note 15, at 326-34
(discussing courts’ general allowance for arbitration of MMWA rights).
77 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding statutory
age discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration).
78 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  CASES AND PROBLEMS
115-18 (2d. ed. 2006) (discussing parties’ challenges of arbitration clauses based on particu-
lar procedures these clauses require).
79 See Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 728-30 (Ala. 2002) (finding arbitration clause
procedures unenforceable because it prevented effective vindication of consumers’ rights
under the MMWA).
80 See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1026-28 (11th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting mortgagors’ argument that an arbitration provision precluding mortgagors from
recovering statutory punitive and treble damages violated the TILA).
81 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2000); Mace E. Gunter, Can
Warrantors Make an End Run?  The Magnuson-Moss Act and Mandatory Arbitration in
Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483, 1487-89 (2000) (discussing purpose and history
of MMWA); Garrett S. Taylor, Read the Fine Print—Alabama Supreme Court Rules that
Binding Arbitration Provisions in Written Warranties Are Okay, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 165,
172-76 (disagreeing with Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Energy Homes,
Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000), to overturn its year-old decision and now hold
MMWA claims arbitrable).
82 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (finding Randolph did not
meet the burden of showing prohibitive costs).
83 See James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 676, 678-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
cost-based challenge of arbitration agreement).
84 See id. (also noting consumers would have to show that overall costs were higher in
arbitration than litigation); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th
Cir. 2003) (ordering arbitration and finding cost questions were for the arbitrator).
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ceed with arbitration not knowing whether the arbitrator will reallocate those
fees in the award or cap them under consumer arbitration rules.85
This has relegated challenges of arbitration provisions to general contract
defenses, which most courts have applied in formalistic fashions.86  Courts and
commentators promote this formalistic enforcement of form terms as necessary
to foster efficiencies and cost savings companies may pass on to their consum-
ers through lower prices and better quality goods and services.87  Courts also
find that there is no duty to inform consumers about arbitration provisions
although they usually require consumers to waive access to statutory judicial
remedies.88  They also have become increasingly formulaic in refusing to ques-
tion assent or apply contract defenses such as lack of consideration and uncon-
scionability to strike arbitration clauses.89
Still, consumers have had some success on unconscionability challenges
of pre-printed form arbitration provisions.  This is more likely when the provi-
sions include “carve-outs” that give the drafter an option to litigate, impose
high costs and fees on consumers, require consumers to travel to inconvenient
locations, or impose remedy limitations that gut statutory claims.90  Indeed,
these provisions often defy the Protocol and institutional consumer rules such
as the AAA Consumer Rules, prompting some courts to use this defiance to
justify their refusal to enforce such terms.91  At the same time, however,
85 See Ragan v. AT&T Corp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1196-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding costs
not prohibitive under an unproven assumption the AAA would apply consumer instead of
commercial rules); Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 362-63 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) (finding that the consumer did not prove prohibitive costs, even assuming application
of the AAA Commercial Rules).
86 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (emphasizing that the FAA
only permits challenges of arbitration clauses based on generally applicable state contract
defenses); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding form arbitration clause was not unconscionable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying assent and unconscionability challenges of
form arbitration clause in boxed terms under strict, efficiency focused analysis).
87 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 434-45, 485-86 (2002) (explaining why electronic con-
tracts are not adhesion contracts and highlighting efficiency benefits of standard form
contracts); see also Whitford, supra note 60, at 643 (highlighting the emergence of leading
contract scholars advocating “a new formalism, which is essentially a return to neoclassical
formalism, in contract law”).
88 See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or. 2002)
(emphasizing no duty to disclose or explain written agreements). But see Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994) (breaking from the majority of courts and
requiring clear and express agreement to arbitrate statutory claims), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
812 (1995).
89 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 73 (2006) (exploring development, evolution, and functions of unconscionability, and
critiquing courts’ formulaic application of unconscionability); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The Return of Unconscionability Analysis
as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 812-13
(2004) (emphasizing restrained application of unconscionability).
90 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 78, at 113-14 (listing suspect terms and citing case support).
91 See Pine Ridge Homes, Inc. v. Stone, No. 05-04-00002-CV, 2004 WL 1730170, at *1-3
(Tex. App. Aug. 3, 2004) (affirming the finding that arbitration provision requiring con-
sumer to pay both parties’ filing fees was “so one-sided as to render it unconscionable”
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 14 16-JAN-08 13:41
50 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:37
targeted applications of unconscionability face FAA preemption when they sin-
gle out arbitration as a “lesser caste.”92
Accordingly, consumers cannot rely on findings of unconscionability to
ease the burdens of onerous arbitration provisions.  Many courts conclude that
arbitration clauses are not so substantively and procedurally unfair that they are
unconscionable.93  Furthermore, although flexible contract law analysis can
foster fairness by accounting for context, courts’ current case-by-case contract
law regulation of arbitration has been inadequate and haphazard.  It has left
consumers without adequate protection and companies without guidance
regarding the enforceability of their arbitration provisions.  The time is there-
fore ripe for legislative limits on what is permissible in consumer arbitration.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
IN CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Legislative clutter certainly has its drawbacks and contractual autonomy is
worth protecting.  However, the dominos of deference to form arbitration pro-
visions stack up against consumers to an extent that justifies the establishment
of clear procedural ground rules for consumer arbitration.  The Protocol then
provides a starting template because its “shoulds” have existed since 1998, and
some courts have given them credence as appropriate fairness standards.  The
FAA’s preemptive force, however, makes it necessary that Congress transform
these “shoulds” into federal legislative “musts” in order to give them true
impact.94  Furthermore, business and consumer voices should aid Congress in
creating legislative standards aimed to balance efficiencies and procedural fair-
ness of arbitration.  To that end, this Article seeks to spark discussion of such
procedural parameters in the hopes of transforming rhetoric into sufficiently
clear guidelines that ease the uncertainties and inadequacies of current
regulation.95
A. Transformation of “Shoulds” to “Musts”
The FAA preempts states’ attempts to require procedural fairness rules for
consumer arbitration or otherwise inhibit enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms.  Furthermore, companies have ignored the Protocol’s
because it defied the Protocol and the AAA Consumer Rules, and the AAA indicated that it
would not enforce such a provision).
92 See Broome, supra note 10, at 65 (arguing that California courts have applied “distorted”
unconscionability analysis to arbitration clauses); Ostolaza, supra note 1, at 265-66, 268
(discussing preemption).
93 Procedural unconscionability asks whether the bargaining process was unduly one-sided,
whereas substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the terms of an arbitration provi-
sion are oppressive or otherwise unfair, and most courts require that one prove both to suc-
ceed on an unconscionability challenge. See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256,
265 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that most states require proof of both elements of
unconscionability).
94 Schmitz, MH Mania, supra note 15, at 355-57.
95 Such legislative fairness standards have been introduced in Congress, but they have
sparked little debate or action. See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S.
3210, 106th Cong. (2000) (bill referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2000).
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“shoulds,” and arbitral institutions have little power or incentive to impose con-
sumer-friendly procedures or otherwise regulate companies’ arbitral programs.
Administering institutions have been under fire for favoring repeat-player com-
panies and promulgating permissive rules that generally allow for companies’
manipulation to their disproportionate advantage.96  In addition, companies
may require ad hoc arbitration, thus eliminating any institutional opportunities
to prescribe consumer rules or otherwise police consumer arbitrations.
Moreover, all companies do not police the fairness of their own arbitration
practices.  Some companies have continued to dictate arbitration provisions that
ignore fairness guidelines such as those the Protocol suggests.  For example,
many companies do not allow for class relief or access to small claims court in
their form arbitration provisions.97  Meanwhile, consumers have limited and
uncertain success in challenging such provisions under general contract theo-
ries.98  Clear minimum standards would therefore at least set a fairness floor for
consumer arbitration.  In addition, such standards may promote efficiency by
providing contracting guidance and limiting costly and uncertain judicial
challenges.
Nonetheless, this is not a call to ban arbitration of consumer disputes.
Again, contractual liberty generally supports enforcement of parties’ agree-
ments.  Furthermore, arbitration may benefit companies and consumers by eas-
ing dispute resolution costs and providing an equitable forum where parties can
air concerns.  However, realities of one-sided form provisions and their burden
on consumers’ access to statutory remedies make fairness standards especially
important for protection of statutory, or public, rights such as those the MMWA
provides.
Any legislated arbitration standards could therefore target these non-nego-
tiable form provisions in cases involving such statutory claims.  Indeed, policy-
makers could begin by clarifying the MMWA’s murky template for creation of
dispute resolution standards.99  The Act expressly encourages warrantors to
establish “informal dispute settlement procedures” for resolution of warranty
claims and charges the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with prescribing
and monitoring minimum requirements for such procedures.100  The FTC then
prescribes broad guidelines for nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms
aimed mainly to ensure that consumers have notice and information regarding
such mechanisms and that the mechanisms are neutral, low cost, expeditious,
and fair.101
96 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing bias claims against NAF).
97 See Collected Cell Phone and Credit Card Arbitration Provisions, supra note 9.
98 See supra Part II.B (discussing courts’ unclear enforcement of arbitration clauses).
99 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2000) (providing for establishment and monitoring of dispute resolu-
tion procedures for consumers’ warranty claims under the Act); 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.8, 703.1-.5
(2007) (establishing disclosure and procedural requirements regarding notice, information,
costs, neutrality, and review); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Motivating the MMWA to Confront
the Consumer Contracting Culture (work in progress, on file with author) (proposing amend-
ments to the MMWA that set forth minimum fairness rules for resolution of warranty claims
under the Act).
100 15 U.S.C. § 2310.
101 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.8, 703.1-.5.
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This seems to open the door for Congress to reinvigorate a MMWA dis-
pute resolution regime with more particularized procedural regulations of war-
rantors’ binding arbitration programs.  Furthermore, a proposal for procedural
regulations may have more legislative muscle than current calls to bar all
predispute arbitration agreements in consumer and employment transactions.102
It also could provide policymakers with a template for regulating arbitration of
consumers’ Truth in Lending Act and other statutory claims.
B. Procedures Aimed to Balance Fairness and Efficiency
Regulation of arbitration agreements’ terms should not quell beneficial use
or sap efficiencies of consumer arbitration programs.  The growth of consumer
arbitration over the past decade indicates that companies must benefit from
their arbitration programs,103 although it is uncertain whether they share these
benefits with consumers.104  Furthermore, some consumers prefer arbitration to
litigation regardless of uncertainties regarding whether it results in lower prices
or higher quality products.105  Accordingly, the Protocol provides a good start-
ing point for establishing fairness guidelines because varied consumer and busi-
ness voices contributed to its creation.106
1. The Protocol’s Starting Points
Although it provides fairly vague aspirations, the Protocol suggests some
guidelines for protecting consumers’ access to remedies through companies’
arbitration programs.  It generally asks arbitration providers to offer consumers
102 Bills banning predispute arbitration provisions in all consumer and employment con-
tracts have not been successful. See, e.g., H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (bill lingering in
committee to amend the FAA to preclude arbitration of employment disputes unless the
employee and employer agree to arbitrate after the dispute arises); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong.
(2005) (another bill lost in committees to preclude enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements in employment contracts); H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005) (bill lost in committee
addressing predatory mortgage lending practices, and including provisions barring enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration agreements in any consumer transactions for personal, family,
or household goods or services).
103 In 2005 alone, the AAA received 1652 consumer disputes including claims related to
banking, lending, credit cards, mortgages, education, home construction, cell phones, real
estate, car sales, warranties, accounting, and financial advice. See E-mail from Jennifer
Jester Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass’n, to Amy J. Schmitz,
Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law (March 16, 2007) (on file with author).  Sixty-
eight percent of these disputes involved claims of less than $75,000. Id.; see also Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Statistics, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29470
(last visited Dec. 12, 2007).
104 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 686-93 (1996) (critiquing free
market justifications for arbitration of consumer claims and concluding that “failing to regu-
late the market with respect to arbitration clauses is likely to lead to an inefficient result that
benefits those who impose form arbitration agreements”).
105 See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-
264, 292 (2006) (proposing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses benefit companies and
consumers).
106 See PROTOCOL, supra note 7 (explaining its collaborative creation in the introductory
notes).
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procedures and remedies deemed essential for them to assert their claims.  The
Protocol therefore requires companies and arbitration administrators to provide
consumers with full information about their arbitration programs, equal voice
in selecting impartial neutrals, the option to proceed in small claims court, rea-
sonable arbitration fees and costs, and convenient hearing locations.  It also
calls for clear time limits, reasoned awards, and preservation of consumers’
access to representation, evidence, adequate hearings, and remedies in arbitra-
tion proceedings.107
a. Notice and Neutrality
Federal arbitration law does not require heightened notice of arbitration
clauses.  Realities of consumer contracting, however, suggest that the law
should require companies to provide consumers with clear notice of an arbitra-
tion clause and information regarding the companies’ arbitration programs to
help legitimize consumers’ consent to form arbitration provisions.  Companies
also should supply resources for consumers to consult to learn more about arbi-
tration providers and procedures.
In addition, it may ease biases resulting from providers’ relationships with
particular companies to allow consumers to participate in choosing arbitration
providers for their cases.108  The Protocol, for example, requires that consum-
ers have an “equal voice” in arbitrator selection and that arbitrators comply
with fairly strict arbitrator disclosure rules.109  Legislative limits also should
further clarify that “equal voice” bars companies from unilaterally choosing
arbitrators and that an award may be vacated if an arbitrator blatantly breaches
disclosure requirements.
This does not mean to suggest that policymakers should mimic California
in vacating an award for any arbitrator failure to make disclosures pursuant to
ethical standards on par with those established for judicial programs.110
Instead, procedural regulations should aim to clarify disclosure standards that
account for the differences between arbitrators and judges, but better ensure
arbitrator neutrality than courts’ currently narrow reading of the FAA’s “evi-
dent partiality” review of awards.111  Furthermore, courts should reconsider
their general refusal to vacate awards for nondisclosure and their reservation of
107 See id.; see also Schmitz, MH Mania, supra note 15, at 345-70 (suggesting guidelines
for arbitration of mobile home consumers’ warranty claims).
108 See, e.g., Posting of Paul Bland, supra note 38 (discussing alleged bias of NAF for
lenders).
109 PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at princ. 3; see also Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill
of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong (2000) (emphasizing that parties should have a right to “a
competent, neutral arbitrator,” and an “equal voice” in arbitrator selection); AAA CONSUMER
RULES, supra note 30 (requiring impartial neutrals).
110 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a)(6) (West 2002) (grounds for vacating arbitration
award) & § 1281.9(a)(1) (West 2007) (grounds for disqualification).  Federal courts have
nonetheless held that the FAA preempts enforcement of these disclosure standards in NASD
arbitrations to the extent they impose standards more stringent than those under the NASD
rules incorporated in such securities-related agreements.  Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v.
Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1136-38 (9th Cir. 2005).
111 See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing
the narrowness of bias under FAA section 10).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 18 16-JAN-08 13:41
54 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:37
what they deem the “draconian” remedy of vacatur for cases involving an arbi-
trator’s “significant compromising relationship” with a party.112  Consumer
arbitration rules should at least follow the new United States Navy arbitration
regulations in requiring “mutual agreement” on arbitrator selection and ensur-
ing arbitrators’ disclosure of “an official, financial or personal conflict of inter-
est with respect to the issue in controversy.”113
b. Reasonable Costs and Locations
Clear cost rules and caps would be a key component of procedural limits.
Consumers’ leading complaint about arbitration is its often high filing costs.
Furthermore, this has burdened parties and courts with inefficiencies and uncer-
tainties of litigation about arbitration in the wake of Randolph.114 Randolph
set hefty hurdles for consumers to prove high costs and inability to pay those
costs, and adopted a “wait-n-see” approach that essentially forces consumers to
complete arbitration procedures in hopes that arbitrators will ease cost burdens
in their awards.115
Mandatory cost limits could help ease these burdens and uncertainties by
automatically capping consumer arbitration fees and costs, or shifting such
costs to companies for low-income consumers subject to form arbitration provi-
sions.116  Furthermore, these rules should not leave consumers to gamble on
whether arbitrators will waive or reduce fees in the award.117  Instead, rules
could set income/cost schedules that administrators or arbitrators could apply at
the outset of arbitration proceedings, subject to variation in special circum-
stances.  California, for example, requires arbitration providers to waive arbi-
tration fees for “indigent” consumers with a gross monthly income that is less
than 300% of the federal poverty guidelines.118  It also mandates that arbitra-
tion providers must give consumers written notice of the right to a fee
waiver.119
112 Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 280-86
(5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (emphasizing the narrow review of arbitration awards as necessary
to preserve its finality).
113 U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5800.15(4), USE OF BINDING ARBI-
TRATION FOR CONTRACT CONTROVERSIES (March 5, 2007), available at http://doni.daps.dla.
mil/SECNAV.aspx (follow “05000 General Management Security and Safety Services”
hyperlink; then follow “05-800 Laws and Legal Services” hyperlink; then follow “5800.15”
hyperlink).
114 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-91 (2000).
115 See id.
116 AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 30 (providing a fee schedule based on claim
amount and capping fees at $250 for telephonic hearings and $750 per day of in person
hearings for claims not exceeding $75,000; also allowing parties to bring claims to small
claims court).
117 AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 40, at R-43 (allowing arbitrator to “assess and
apportion the fees, expenses, and compensation related to such award as the arbitrator deter-
mines is appropriate” and to award attorneys’ fees if authorized by the parties’ agreement or
other law); Id. at R-49 (allowing AAA to defer or reduce fees upon showing of hardship); Id.
at R-50 (requiring parties to bear expenses equally unless they agree otherwise or the arbitra-
tor assesses expenses in the award).
118 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1284.3(b)(1) (West 2007).
119 Id. § 1284.3(b)(2).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 19 16-JAN-08 13:41
Fall 2007] DANGERS OF DEFERENCE 55
Nonetheless, such rules should require consumers to show need or that
they meet stated income standards.120  In addition, cost limits should account
for savings of expedited proceedings and use of telephonic or “desk” arbitration
options that allow parties to tell the arbitrator about their cases online or during
conference calls.121  Such desk or telephonic hearings may ease expenses of
arbitration by eliminating travel, minimizing scheduling hassles, and streamlin-
ing discovery and recording procedures.122  However, such hearings also may
augment consumers’ technological disadvantages123 and diminish healing ben-
efits of in-person discussions.124
Arbitration regulations should therefore give consumers the option of in-
person hearings at convenient locations.  They also should preserve the option
of bringing disputes to small claims court in appropriate cases.125  The Proto-
col, for example, preserves this option and requires that any arbitration hearings
be “at a location which is reasonably convenient to both parties.”126
c. Preservation of Remedies and Class Relief
Policymakers should take special care to acknowledge the distinctions
between arbitration and remedy or rights waivers.  Companies should not be
permitted to use arbitration clauses to quash consumers’ statutory rights and
meaningful access to remedies.127  This is fast becoming common practice,
however, as companies promulgate form arbitration provisions that bar con-
sumers’ recovery of punitive or exemplary damages, collection of attorney fees,
and access to class relief.  These provisions chill consumers’ claims and stymie
public policies.128  Furthermore, they hinder consumers’ prosecution of class
120 California requires consumers requesting waivers to declare under oath their income and
number of persons in their households, but does not allow arbitration providers to require
additional evidence of indigence. Id. § 1284.3(b)(3).  Perhaps it would better prevent fraud
to require consumers to present additional proof when their statements lack credibility due to
other evidence.
121 See PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at princ. 6 (calling providers to develop programs “which
entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the dispute, including,
among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of the goods or services
provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay”).
122 AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 30.
123 See Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business:  Recommendations
for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transac-
tions, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 470-71 (2002) (explaining that a consumer may not
have technological tools, online computer time, or sufficient computer skills to participate in
cyber mediation or arbitration).
124 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me:  Reflections on Mediation, Ine-
quality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 (1997) (discussing psychological
benefits of in-person mediation).
125 See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000)
(section 17(c)(11) of proposed rules requiring that parties have the right to opt out of arbitra-
tion for small claims).
126 PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at princ. 7.
127 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2003) (stating rules for enforcing warranty exclusions and modifi-
cations in contracts for sale of goods).
128 See, e.g., Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 599-601 (Wis. 1978)
(explaining that punitive damages aim to punish or deter bad conduct).
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proceedings as “private attorneys general,”129 which is especially important in
light of limited and disparate enforcement of consumer protections by states’
public attorneys general.130
Accordingly, legislative “musts” should at least protect consumers’ rights
to recover statutory attorney fees on prevailing claims.  This also helps counter-
act attorneys’ distaste for representing consumers with small claims in arbitra-
tion.  In addition, it may also be proper to preserve consumers’ access to class
relief in appropriate cases.131  Such relief could be limited, however, by special
procedures for certification, class notice, award strictures, and disclosures.132
Furthermore, any class relief requirements should account for rules capping
consumers’ arbitration costs, as lower costs may help ease burdens of asserting
claims in individual arbitrations.133
2. Additional Ideas to Consider
The Protocol is only a starting point for transforming fairness “shoulds”
into legislative “musts.”  Congress also should take the opportunity to clarify
its vague “reasonableness” standards and to adopt additional procedural param-
eters aimed to balance consumer and corporate interests.134  For example, it is
important that arbitration be final and time-limited to prevent unnecessary
delays that may harass opponents and frustrate efficiency benefits of arbitra-
tion.  At the same time, fairness rules should protect parties’ rights to be heard
and present their cases.  To that end, legislative rules again could borrow from
the U.S. Navy arbitration regulations in guarding parties’ reasonable hearing
129 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5-22, 97-104 (2000) (discussing
arbitration’s effect on consumers’ access to class relief and proposing that companies should
not be permitted to hinder consumers’ vindication of statutory rights through class relief
waivers). But see Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Ct. App. 1986)
(gathering cases and stating this conclusion).  These and other competing concerns make this
a question for further debate among interested constituencies. Cf. Bruce Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:  Reality and Rem-
edy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2000) (proposing that “class action in reality is an
instrument of abuse and corruption”); Sternlight, supra, at 12-15 (noting how class actions
allow small dollar claimants to assert their rights more economically as a group).
130 See Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection:  Explaining State Attorney
General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 609-18 (2006) (report-
ing study of disparate enforcement of consumer protections by usually elected state attorneys
general due to economics and politics).
131 Class arbitration is controversial and uncertain, and full debate is beyond this Article.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447-59 (2003) (eluding the question of
whether Green Tree can contractually preclude class relief in its consumer arbitration clauses
by holding that arbitrators must first determine whether the clauses preclude class
arbitration).
132 See, e.g., AAA CLASS ARBITRATION, supra note 31 (covering these and other special
issues of concern in class arbitration).
133 See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 30 (discussing caps on consumers’ arbitration
costs).
134 See, e.g., Schmitz, MH Mania, supra note 15, at 345-65 (providing additional sugges-
tions for reform).
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rights, but also requiring shorter timelines for claims of $100,000 or less and
written awards within thirty days after close of the arbitration hearing.135
Furthermore, legislative regulations should ensure that parties have access
to evidence and information they need to present their cases.  They must be
cautious, however, not to impose costly and time-consuming procedures that
overly judicialize proceedings.  Policymakers should therefore preserve allow-
ance for streamlined discovery and evidentiary rules in consumer arbitration.136
Arbitration should not simply become private litigation.  The key is to balance
consumers’ benefits from such rules with risks of increased prices and interest
rates resulting from judicialized procedures.137
Policymakers also could craft rules that help streamline proceedings and
contain costs by allowing for liberal joinder in proper cases involving the same
issues and disputes.  This may save all parties the costs, time, and hassles of
multiple proceedings.  It also may help stop companies from dodging responsi-
bility by blaming each other for warranty claims.138  Furthermore, parallel pro-
ceedings create risks of inconsistent rulings.139  Again, these are suggestions
for policymakers to consider and debate.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for Congress to consider adoption of fairness regulations
for consumer arbitration under non-negotiable form contracts, especially where
necessary to protect statutory rights.  The Protocol’s provisos can no longer
linger as “shoulds” that companies may ignore in drafting their consumer form
contracts.  Instead, this Article invites policymakers to develop clear rules that
balance fairness and efficiency, and ease uncertainties of current contract
defense regulation.  Of course, this is a tough task.  It is nonetheless a task
worth tackling in order to preserve consumers’ access to statutory remedies,
quell the rising tide of arbitration litigation, and ease consumers’ skepticism
and negativity toward companies’ arbitration regimes.
135 U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 113, at 5800.15(3)-(6).
136 Compare Sternlight, supra note 104, at 683-84 (warning of dangers of corporations’ use
of arbitration to prevent consumers from getting needed discovery), with Stephen J. Ware,
Paying the Price of Process:  Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 93 (discussing drawbacks of judicialized arbitration).
137 See Ware, supra note 136, at 90 (noting how judicialization of proceedings often results
in increased business costs that are passed on to the populace through higher prices).
138 See Schmitz, MH Mania, supra note 15, at 313-26, 360-61 (proposing liberal joinder in
mobile home warranty cases).
139 See id.
